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Speed, "Jointness" Not Seen as Key Elements of U.S. Win
War College Report Says Technologies, Iraqi Ineptness, Were Prime Factors
By PATRICIA KIME
Sea Power Correspondent
An early draft of a study by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute plays down the significance of speed in Operation Iraqi Freedom and says the effort did not necessarily illustrate that "jointness" is a precondition for a low-casualty win.
The report takes a different tack from earlier "lessons learned" assessments, many of which emphasize quickness and joint interoperability as major contributing factors in the successful invasion. Warning that future commanders shouldn't make assumptions about the impact of precision and speed on an operation, the study says they need to be able to tell in advance whether an enemy is skilled or inept.
If affirmed as they are reviewed, the War College report findings would have implications for strategists of all military services.
Seven War College analysts, led by Associate Research Professor Stephen D. Biddle, interviewed 176 military personnel ranking from the E-5 to O-9 pay grades, as well as Iraqi war prisoners, for the study, according to a preliminary presentation of the study, entitled "Iraq and the Future of Warfare, Implications for the Army and Defense Policy."
The presentation says the study was initiated to answer several questions posed by the war: How was Saddam Hussein toppled with low coalition losses, without the enemy's resorting to weapons of mass destruction or scorching the earth, and with only moderate collateral damage? For the answers, the group held interviews at various sites in the combat theater, from Baghdad to Basra, at Umm Qasr and in other hot spots. They also met with armed services personnel in Kuwait and the United States. They observed battlefield terrain and searched through hundreds of documents written on the conflict.
According to the presentation about the report, evidence suggests that speed and luck played smaller roles than initially thought; jointness was not necessarily a precondition for the victory; and the "key determinants" of success were the synergy between advanced coalition technologies as well as a major imbalance in skill between the opposing forces.
Regarding speed, analysts sought to determine whether it affected the Iraqis' ability to track coalition forces, hampered their communications, demoralized the defenders or prevented them from using scorched-earth tactics or weapons of mass destruction. The War College analysts found several examples that showed Iraqi intelligence was not as affected as previously thought by the speed of the invasion.
"The Iraqis used low-tech means to assemble pictures sufficient to move paramilitaries, multiple Republican Guard divisions in ways that imply timely knowledge of our whereabouts," the draft report said.
Throughout the conflict, U.S. positions were monitored continually by Iraqi scouts in civilian clothes, and Iraqi corps commanders had clear pictures of the battlefield, according to authors of the study. Iraq's intelligence-gathering capabilities remained largely intact despite confusion caused by a swift-moving enemy, the report said.
It cites such examples as Iraq's having deployed divisions directly in front of the V Corps axis of advance; knowing where the advance was coming from; Marines' having captured a detailed, accurate sand table of U.S. positions at Nasiriya; and Iraqis' entry into Najaf via the sole undefended route without accidental contact with U.S. blocking forces. These examples, the report says, show Iraq was able to maintain an operational picture despite the swift attack.
The report also said that based on interviews, speed did not appear to play a role in the breakdown of Iraqi morale. "In Baghdad, Special Republican Guard and paramilitary resistance did not collapse when the 3rd Infantry Division arrived at the outskirts. It was only broken by defeat via close combat in the urban center. ... In Basra, paramilitary resistance continued for two weeks, broken only by defeat via close combat ... in Nasiriyah, Najaf and Samawah, Iraqi resistance continued long after coalition forces bypassed cities."
On the other major topic of analysis, joint operations, the study refutes early reporting that touts Iraqi Freedom as the ultimate in successful joint operations. "For jointness to be [a] necessary condition for low-cost victory implies that without it, cost would have been much higher," the study says.
Yet after examining several battles involving troops of only one force, including cavalry charges against dug-in Republican Guards and I Marine Expeditionary Force advance through stiff resistance with very little close air support, the researchers concluded that "little evidence shows that Operation Iraqi Freedom low-cost victory is attributable to a significant increase in jointness."
Furthermore, the presentation states that in 1991, a less-joint Coalition offensive with smaller technology edge defeated Iraqis at lower loss rate.
That academic observance is likely to ruffle feathers in the Defense Department, which has pointed to Iraqi Freedom as a shining example of "joint force synergy."
In a Pentagon briefing to reporters Oct. 2 about early lessons learned, Army Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone praised the use of joint forces and interoperability in the conflict.
"I believe we have a coherent application of joint force, of what happens if you have a plan that takes really the application of special operations forces in a very important and unprecedented manner in terms of the roles and responsibility they have. You link that with the application of precision fires on a scope and scale across an entire theater previously unseen. You tie that to ground maneuver over distances with rapid speed ... and you enable that with joint logistics, and put them together in a plan in such a way they can't be taken apart. That is the coherent application of joint force. And that's what General Franks' plan did," Cone said.
If speed and "purple" operations can't be considered the most significant factors in the U.S. success, then what other factors came into play? The War College group concluded that Iraqi ineptitude and the coalition's ability to use "technological sophistication" to punish Iraq's errors were important determinants and shouldn't be overlooked.
The Iraqis had very poor marksmanship skills, relied on numerous self-defeating tactics, suffered from poor leadership, were improperly prepared, had dilapidated equipment and lacked the ability to exploit the potential of their native urban terrain, the authors observed.
"The result was the U.S. could use the maximum scope of its technological advantages to affect outcome, and the combination of 21st Century technology and Iraqi exposure ... enabled small, well-trained coalition forces to succeed at very low losses," the presentation says.
But it also warns that "success requires advanced technology and skill mismatch;" either alone is insufficient.
The analysis concludes that if U.S. forces had not had up-to-date technology, even the inept Iraqi forces could have inflicted heavier casualties, and if the Iraqi forces had been more skilled, technology alone would not have been sufficient to conquer the force with low losses.
"To assume that precision and information will always permit small forces to succeed would be high risk ... but to assume that precision and information will never again permit small forces to succeed would be over-conservative," the report says.
"Campaign planners must be able to tell the difference--in advance--between skilled and exposed enemies," it adds.
Whether the final report will look anything like the presentation that is circulating but not officially published remains to be seen. Biddle said a copy is "circulating in cyberspace," but he told Sea Power on October 30 that changes have been made to the draft and will continue as it is reviewed and edited. He declined to predict when the final report will be released.
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