http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land ... astmbt.pdf
With its superb integration of firepower,
mobility, and armor protection,
the M1A2 Abrams is very nearly the
ultimate incarnation of the main battle
tank (MBT). Although more advanced
design concepts have been published in
recent years, it will likely prove quite
difficult to produce an MBT sufficiently
superior (to the M1A2) to justify
the cost, so why not look for a better
idea?
The Missile Option
When Egyptian Saggers surprised Israeli
tankers in the 1973 Yom Kippur
War, there were many who proclaimed,
“The tank is dead!” A quarter-century
later, tank advocates point to the continued
use of the MBT as proof that the
best antitank weapon is still another
gun-armed tank. Yet it may be that the
missile proponents were not wrong in
their pronouncement — just premature.
Missiles that are guided to the target
by a human operator (e.g., TOW,
Dragon, Sagger) can be neutralized by
distracting or killing the gunner. This
would be analogous to World War II
dive bombers being fired on by a battleship’s
antiaircraft guns; disrupt the
pilot’s concentration and the bomb impacts
harmlessly into the sea.
But an electronic brain does not — as
far as we know — feel fear or get distracted
by nearby shellbursts. It also
has immensely faster reaction times
than a human. These factors make electronic
guidance far superior to human
control for guided missiles.
The self-guided missile has eclipsed
the large-caliber gun in naval surface
warfare. It is about to do so in the
realm of land combat. The tank cannon
has a maximum effective range of
about 3000 meters, and precise aim is
required to make a hit. The self-guided
missile, however, can — like Longbow
Hellfire — be effective to more than
8000 meters, and the electronic brain
continually corrects the flight path as
necessary.
Although Longbow Hellfire was designed
for the AH-64D Apache helicopter,
there is no obvious reason it
couldn’t be fired from an armored vehicle.
Indeed, at least one nation is apparently
developing a similar system.
According to the August/December
1993 issue of ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW,
India has developed the NAG, a
fire-and-forget antitank missile with a
range of six kilometers. It was planned
that the NAG would be the armament
for a tracked combat vehicle. With
ground surveillance radar (GSR) incorporated
into its fire control system,
such a combat vehicle could engage
targets through fog and smoke screens
that block thermal sights. U.S. tank
crewmen have never had to face a
weapon system with such capabilities.
In the United States, the self-guided
Javelin missile system began being issued
to the troops in mid-1996. Although
it was designed as a manportable,
antiarmor missile for infantry use,
there is a growing awareness that Javelin
has enormous potential as a vehiclemounted
weapon. For example, the
U.S. Marine Corps is investigating how
Javelin can be incorporated into the
new advanced amphibious assault vehicle
(AAAV). Another idea would have
single or multiple Javelin launchers installed
on the M113A3 armored personnel
carrier, thereby vastly increasing
the combat capability of the venerable
APC.
Because Javelin’s 2000-meter maximum
range is less than optimal for vehicle
employment, the follow-on to
TOW (FOTT) program is underway.
FOTT will also use fire-and-forget
technologies, but it will probably have
a maximum range of 4000-5000 meters.
MBT or FCS?
The Army’s modernization plan, as
made public in September 1996, calls
for continued upgrades to the Abrams
fleet, while conducting research on a
future combat system (FCS). The FCS
is expected to enter production around
2015, replacing the M1-series tanks.
Since the next generation armored
fighting vehicle is no longer referred to
as an MBT, can it be inferred that the
future combat system need not be a
tank as we know it today?
If self-guided missiles are chosen for
the primary armament of the FCS, a
number of advantages present themselves.
For one, it ought to be possible
to eliminate the turret assembly; this
would greatly simplify construction,
with a corresponding decrease in production
cost and vehicle weight. As
currently configured, an MBT needs a
turret to enable 360-degree target engagement
without changing hull direction.
At a traverse rate of, say, 40 degrees
per second, it would take over
four seconds to reverse the direction of
the gun tube. For the FCS, if vertical
launch is feasible, “traverse” could be
done electronically and instantaneously,
without any actual movement of the
launch tubes; for horizontal launch,
some form of physical traverse mechanism
might be necessary, though.
The Abrams’ maximum rate of fire is
about six rounds per minute; if a single
M1A2 were to engage a half dozen enemy
tanks, the Abrams would be subject
to return fire for nearly a full minute,
since each opponent would have to
be dealt with sequentially. On the other
hand, a properly-designed, missilearmed
FCS could lock onto all six en-
14 ARMOR — July-August 1997
The M1A2 Abrams:
The Last Main Battle Tank?
by Stanley C. Crist
“Since the next generation
armored fighting
vehicle is no longer
referred to as an MBT,
can it be inferred that
the future combat system
need not be a tank
as we know it today?”
emy vehicles simultaneously and salvo
fire one missile at each target in perhaps
less time than the M1A2 crew
would take to achieve its first kill. This
would give an FCS-equipped force a
great advantage when fighting outnumbered.
Ideally, the FCS would use a multipurpose
missile that can be employed
not only against armored vehicles, but
the entire array of ground and aerial
targets encountered on the battlefield.
As on modern naval vessels, it would
probably be wise to include a small- or
medium-caliber gun for close range
and low priority targets, but this would
depend on the capabilities of the missile
system.
Back to the Future
No doubt most MBT proponents will
object to the idea that a missile-armed
future combat system can make obsolete
the gun-armed main battle tank.
Perhaps they would find it worthwhile
to ponder the words of Rear Admiral
Austin M. Knight in his introduction to
the 1917 book, The United States Navy
— From the Revolution to Date:
“And through all its changes the
backbone of the fleet has continued to
be the fighting ship of large and steadily
increasing size, with powers of offense
and defense evenly balanced
upon the whole — recognizing the
menace of secondary enemies and
guarding against them as best it may,
but seeing its real opponent in the battleships
and dreadnoughts of the enemy.
The dreadnought of today has
succeeded, through gradual, not revolutionary,
development, to the line-of-battle
ship of two centuries ago. It may be
that this type is soon to become obsolete,
but the evidence that this is so appeals
far more strongly to the popular
imagination than to the seasoned judgment
of students of naval warfare.”
Substitute “battle tank” and “land
warfare” for the terms “battleship” and
“naval warfare,” and the paragraph
would read almost as if it were printed
in a current issue of ARMOR. Admiral
Knight’s words should stand as a note
of caution to those who think the MBT
ARMOR — July-August 1997 15
Lethality, range, and accuracy of the Harpoon antiship missile has enabled modern cruisers
and destroyers to become the Navy’s primary surface combatants, a role that used
to belong to the heavily-armored, direct-fire, big-gun battleships. (Photo: U.S. Navy)
As in naval warfare, aerial combat is now dominated by guided missiles; guns have
been relegated to the status of backup weapons. (Photo: U.S. Air Force)
Disturbing parallels to land warfare?
is here to stay. Just as the self-guided
missile has displaced the gun in naval
warfare, so is it sure to do in ground
combat. The question is, will the Armor
community follow Javelin and
Longbow Hellfire on the path to the future,
or will it stay on the same dead
end street that doomed the battleship to
oblivion?
Bibliography
Robin Fletcher, “The Crewing and Configuration
of the Future Main Battle Tank,” ARMOR,
May-June 1995.
George Forty, Tank Action—From The Great
War to the Gulf, Alan Sutton Publishing Limited,
1995.
Wes Glasgow, COL Christopher Cardine, and
David Latson, “The M1A2: Current and Future
Program Plans,” ARMOR, May-June
1996.
COL Frank Hartline, “Letters,” ARMOR, September-
October 1996.
Christopher T. Heun, “Army and Abrams Tank
Linked for the Long Haul,” National DEFENSE,
November 1996.
Peter M. Keating, “Agile, Elusive Armored Killer
Will Stalk 21st Century Arena,” National
DEFENSE, September 1996.
MAJ James K. Morningstar, “Javelins and Skirmishers
on the Battlefield,” ARMOR, May-
June 1996.
Francis J. Reynolds, The United States Navy—
From the Revolution to Date, P.F. Collier and
Son, 1917.
David Schueler, “Battlewagons Eternal: A History
of the Iowa Class Battleships,” COMMAND,
Jan-Feb 1992.
Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon,
“Forward Area Air-Ground Defense,” ARMOR,
July-August 1996.
CPT Harold L. Spurgeon and Stanley C. Crist,
“The Tank Is Dead — Long Live the Tank!”
ARMOR, March-April 1987.
Hellfire, seen here being fired from an M113, can hit targets as far away as 8000 meters—
almost three times as far as the Abrams! If adapted to the Longbow Hellfire system, ground
forces would have a heretofore unknown combat capability. (Photo: Rockwell International)
The shape of things to come? A missile-armed Future Combat System might resemble
the Bradley-LOSAT prototype shown here. A very low silhouette is made possible by a
turretless configuration. (Photo: Loral Vought Systems)
Stanley Crist is a former tank
commander, having served with
the 3d Battalion, 185th Armor.
He is a previous contributor to
ARMOR.
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, and could put a full 30rd FFE on target in about 90 seconds, including the call for fire and adjustment round, if neccesary.