The Bradley performed EXTREMELY well in OIF, providing <i>nearly</i> all around protection against RPG type weapons at ranges of 200 meters or more.
I JUST NOW recieved the AAR of TM C/1-15, one of the lead elements involved in OIF, and it specificly mentions the Bradley many times. This is an EXTREMELY informative report- read it!
So, without further adeiu, here is what the CO of that unit had to say about armored MOUT in Baghdad, etc.(This was kindly provided to me by a friend of mine that is a retired light colonel in the RCA.)
There were some SERIOUS flaws in the doctrine and planning of this operation, as is about to be painfully made clear(i will highlight these in bold print)...
"Unclassified After Action Report From Iraq
September 12, 2003
24 APRIL 2003
SUBJECT: Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Review Comments
1. The purpose of this document is to provide after action review comments after combat operations conducted by TM C/3-15 Infantry, Task Force 1-64 Armor "Desert Rogues" during "Operation Iraqi Freedom.
2. All comments will be broken down into the following format: issue, discussion, and recommendation.
3. Doctrine/TTP's (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures).
Issue: <b>Current Urban Operations Doctrine does not support operations conducted by this unit</b>.
Discussion: The current doctrinal manuals on Urban Operations do not address how best to utilize armored forces in an urban environment. <b>No degree of IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Batlefield) could compensate, alert, or prepare any US force for the massive numbers of RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) stored in houses, shacks, lockers, and cars. The only way to counter RPGs fired from covered and concealed positions was to absorb the hit, identify the source of the fire, and respond with massive overwhelming firepower.
</b> The enemy faced by this unit hid his tanks and vehicles under camouflaged covers, beneath bridge overpasses, inside of buildings on narrow streets, and under low trees. <b>These enemy systems were not seen until they were only meters away.</b>
<b>Tanks and Bradleys repeatedly sustained hits from RPG's and ground directed anti aircraft fire that dismounted infantrymen, HMMWVs and other light skinned vehicles could not sustain. Bradleys successfully protected the infantrymen inside while at the same time delivering a massive volume of fire against dismounted enemy, trucks, tanks, and armored vehicles. The firepower and shock generated by tanks and Bradleys could never have been matched by dismounted infantry. Without the use of these systems initially, the enemy would have caused many more casualties.
</b>
The current doctrine recommends clearing the built up area with dismounted troops prior to any armored vehicles entering. This Task Force proved that this is not a requirement and is not necessarily the best initial course of action. By moving armored vehicles along a pre determined route and destroying any enemy forces whether dug in, in buildings, or on roof tops with massive overwhelming fires from M1A1 tanks and M2A2 fighting vehicles, an entire line of communication can be opened up allowing access not only into the built up area but through it also. Once the line of communication is open, clearing operations with dismounted forces are much easier. A key to this is the overwhelming psychological effect the firepower of these weapon systems have on the enemy once the initial raid is conducted, almost all remaining enemy forces will withdraw from the initial shock. This initial shock of overwhelming firepower facilitates the attacks of dismounted infantrymen into the built up area.
Recommendation: The BCT submit to the United States Army Infantry School and the United States Armor School an update to the current urban operations doctrine. <b>Additionally, send only vehicles that can sustain RPG hits into urban combat zones. </b>
Issue: Problems arising from the simultaneous conduct of SASO (Stability and Support Operations) and combat operations in Iraq.
Discussion: After less than 48 hours after the first battlefield engagement, members of this company team were tasked to conduct checkpoint operations southwest of An Najaf. With no training, soldiers were expected to search vehicles, interact with civilians with no CA (Civil Affairs) or PSYOPS (Psychological Warfare) support, detain EPW's (Enemy Prisoners of War), and confiscate weapons. Less than 48 hours after this, the unit was again heavily engaged in combat operations. <b>The radical and swift change from combat operations to SASO and back to combat operations over and over again causes many points of friction for the soldiers and their leaders.
</b>
With the exception of a class given to the platoon leaders, there were not formal classes or training conducted by CA prior to the operation. <b>No training on checkpoint operations or dealing with civilians was received. </b>
Material resources continued to be an issue. The team brought extra CL IV on all vehicles in anticipation of having to conduct blocking operations but the capability to haul the quantities required by SASO was not there. <b>Having emplaced checkpoints on four different occasions, by the time the unit reached Baghdad, there was no remaining CL IV (construction and barrier materials). The unit was in desperate need of materials for force protection. It took weeks for materials to arrive; in the meantime the unit utilized destroyed cars, flower posts, bicycle racks, and whatever else was available for force protection. </b>
<b>Interpreters were not available to the company team at any point during the operation.</b> These interpreters are critical to the team's ability to interact with civilians, discern their problems, and broadcast friendly unit intentions. <b>Often times the unit had crowds and upset civilians to deal with and absolutely no way to verbally communicate with them. </b>
Lack of information from higher headquarters greatly complicated the task of converting from high intensity conflict to SASO. <b>Weeks after occupying Baghdad in force, the unit is still unable to direct the civilian populace to humanitarian agencies other than the Red Crescent. We have no way to direct people to places to receive food and water, to search for loved ones, to located deceased personnel. The unit did not have the ability to answer any questions simply because of the unsynchronized and unplanned operations of the Civil Affairs community and other non-governmental organizations. </b>
The problem with the switching from combat to SASO is the impact on the soldiers and leaders of the unit. Transitioning from combat to SASO requires a substantial and fundamental shift in attitude. <b>The soldiers have been asked to go from killing the enemy to protecting and interacting, and back to killing again. The constant shift in mental posture greatly complicates things for the average soldier. The soldiers are blurred and confused about the rules of engagement, which continues to raise questions, and issues about force protection while at checkpoints and conducting patrols. How does the soldier know exactly what the rule of engagement is? Soldiers who have just conducted combat against dark skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes have difficulty trusting dark skinned personnel wearing civilian clothes.</b>
Recommendation:
A. Integrate SASO training into the unit METL (MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST). This was has provided ample instances where units are conducting both combat and stability operations at the same time. Thus, we should no longer expect to be able to compartmentalize ourselves as either "war fighter: or "peacekeeper". With the ever-present threat of terrorist attack, it is critical that soldiers know the correct tactics, techniques, and procedures for providing security while also enforcing peace.
B. Heavy duty CL IV materials are required for blocking positions and should be maintained at the task force or BCT level. Lift and freight assets need to be responsive and capable of delivering reinforcing materials in short order.
C. Civil Affairs, pysops, and interpreters must be integrated at the company team level. Every checkpoint must have an interpreter and these interpreters must be with the company team throughout the operation as it is impossible to predict when you may be required to fight or keep the peace.
D. Improved information flow and the quicker establishment of Civil Military Operations Centers. Units occupying positions in built up areas make frequent contact with civilians. Information and a centralized theme must be passed to the company team level as quickly as possible to ensure the proper message is being sent to the populace, and in turn, input from the populace is reaching the highest levels. The company team level is the level where the interaction with the populace occurs.
E. We must train our leaders and soldiers in the conduct of SASO operations. Leaders must be sensitive to the flux between war fighting and peacekeeping and the demands of each not only on the unit but the individual. We owe it to our soldiers to train them on the differences. It is the responsibility of leaders to ensure PVT Plunger and PVT Snuffy know what the proper posture or attitude is and to enforce it.
Issue: The employment of Hunter Killer teams.
<b>Discussion: This unit, while conducting combat operations, had great success through the utilization of hunter killer teams. The combination of scouts with LRASS (Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System) and tanks and fighting vehicles proved invaluable at the detection and destruction of enemy vehicles and dismounted infiltration attempts.
</b>
By locating a scout section with LRASS, which could observe out to 10,000m, at a location that had maximum observation, the scouts, could provide real time intelligence and 10 digit grid locations to the company team enabling the company team to move to and engage with direct fires and/or utilize mortar fires to destroy enemy forces. This proved to be a great TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) while at OBJ RAMS, An Najaf, and while blocking on HWY 1.
Recommendation: Doctrine be published based upon the success of the task force operations utilizing hunters and killers, specifically, integrating scouts, infantry, and armor forces into an effective organization which can identify, assess, and destroy the enemy.
4. Training
Issue: Urban Operations Training for armor forces
Discussion: The armor platoon attached to this CO/TM was fortunate enough to receive UO (Urban Operations) training prior to operations in Iraq. They learned valuable lessons such as firing from the GAS(auxilliary) sight at extremely close ranges, entering a battle sight range of 300m while in urban environments for the main gun, and decentralizing the location of CL I (food), water, and CL III(P) (fuel) on the tank in order to protect from losing all supplies due to a single hit or building strike. They learned to keep their tanks out of intersections and to scan the upper stories of buildings and rooftops for enemy forces. They practiced transporting infantry and coordinating direct fires with dismounted forces. These and other TTPs gave the platoon the confidence and experience required when attacks to Baghdad and raids south on HWY 8 were conducted.
Recommendation: All armor platoons should be trained and integrated into urban operations training. Although the tactics trained may not have been executed, the lessons learned regarding load plans, fire control system adjustments, fire patterns, and scanning responsibilities were instrumental to the platoon's success. Every effort should be made to teach these lessons prior to combat.
Tank platoons should also train with a dismounted squad under the control of a tank platoon leader. At a battle position in Baghdad, 3/A/1-64 AR was attached a weapons squad from an infantry platoon. These soldiers were critical to the platoon's defense. They were tied in between two tanks along a dismounted avenue of approach. It was composed of a heavy tree line and thick vegetation that closed to within 50 meters of the platoon's position. The squad repelled an RPG team's attempt to infiltrate the platoon BP and also cleared seven bunkers full of weapons and ammunition. <b>These feats could not have been accomplished without the task organized infantry squad.
</b>
Issue: Machine gun engagement training for loaders.
Discussion: Thanks to numerous live fire opportunities, the armor platoon loaders were all experienced in firing the loader's M240 machine gun prior to operations in Iraq. When battle came, these soldiers comfortably understood the behavior of their weapons system and were able to place effective, deadly fire on the enemy. There was a dramatic improvement in their performance from the first time they fired their machine guns in training to the use of the weapons in combat.
Recommendation: Incorporate a loader's engagement into Tank Table VIII scenarios. This will compel units to train loaders on their weapon system and give loaders invaluable experience and opportunities to refine their techniques. This unit was fortunate enough to have the time and ammunition to learn these skills on their own; others may not have that luxury.
5. Equipment.
<b>Issue: The lack of adequate armor on the flanks of Bradley and Tank turrets and hulls. </b>
<b>Discussion: Enemy fire from recoilless rifles and RPGs was able to penetrate fuel cells, turrets, and ammunition compartments at ranges of less then 200m. Penetrations in tanks occurred in armor behind the number six skirt and in the turret armor at the rear corners of the turret.</b>
<b>The Task Force was not issued reactive armor for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle even though it is available in the Army system. This armor would have prevented the 4 direct penetrating hits from RPG rounds received by fighting vehicles in the task force.</b>
<b>As a result of not being issued reactive armor, both Bradley and tank crews had to "create" their own armor through the use of rucksacks, water boxes, MRE's, etc. All of which helped but were still penetrated by the RPG and recoilless rifle rounds. </b>
<b>Recommendation: Issue reactive armor to all available vehicles to prevent penetration by AT systems. Ballistic skirts should be fitted along the entire flank of vehicles going into urban combat. Reactive armor on the turret flanks and the turret top would protect the crew from anti tank weapons fired from rooftops as well as ground level.
The armor packages need to be modular and configured so that the crew or organizational mechanics can apply or remove the armor.
This armor is currently available for the M2A2 but needs to be made available for the M1A1 and the M113 series vehicle for the conduct of combat in urban operations.
</b>
Issue: Lack of a Bradley CDR (commander) weapon system.
Discussion: During the conduct of urban operations by this unit, due to limited visibility within the turret and the threat encountered not only from the front but from both flanks of the vehicles, Bradley commanders were required to expose themselves outside of the turret in order to acquire enemy forces, to control movement, and protect their own vehicles. <b>As a result of this, most BC's adapted to this and began to keep M231 port firing weapons and "bags of hand grenades" on top of their turrets in order to defeat enemy forces in close proximity to their vehicle or enemy forces on the side opposite of gun tube orientation.</b>
Recommendation: A M240 machine gun similar to that mounted on the M1A1 tank for loaders, be mounted on the M2 Bradley Commander's Turret. This would enable the BC to defend his vehicle from threats opposite of the gun tube and also in close proximity to the vehicle. BC's would no longer be required to keep their personal weapons or hand grenades on top of the turret in order to repel enemy attacks.
Issue: Effective communication between tanks and dismounted Infantry.
Discussion: On several occasions, infantry squads were attached to the armor platoon in the CO/TM to provide additional security at checkpoints/blocking positions and to defend dismounted avenues of approach at battle positions. <b>The tanks were forced to utilize Motorola "talkabout" radios to communicate with the squad. This was problematic for several reasons: 1. Lack of net security, 2. "Talkabout" radios are not integrated into the tank internal communication system, 3. Lack, or prohibition of "talkabout" radios in theater. This is the same problem encountered by infantry platoons due to the lack of dismountable frequency hop capable radios at the platoon level. </b>
Recommendation: Issue PRC148, frequency hop capable radios, to all infantry squads or give each tank platoon an extra dismountable SINCGARS radio. TA1 phones mounted externally to the tank proved to be inadequate. They were unreliable and lacked the flexibility to successfully move with the infantry as they left their holes and cleared bunkers.
Issue: Loaders exposed to enemy machine gun fire at close range in urban operations combat.
Discussion: <b>Loaders played a critical role in identifying, suppressing, and destroying enemy infantry, vehicles, and RPG teams on the flanks of their vehicles down alleys and behind buildings as we advanced in column along roads. The observation and suppression abilities of loaders are critical to the success of the tank and the unit and compel them to stay outside the loader's hatch. However, the only protection for loaders against enemy small arms fire came from the spall vests and effective suppression of the enemy. Had enemy fire been more accurate or intense, many loaders would have been killed or wounded. </b>
Recommendation: Develop and employ an armor plate that attaches to the loader's M240 machine gun mount and covers the vital areas of the loader's body. It should be easy to add or remove quickly (within seconds) in order to facilitate the expedient closure of the loader's hatch. It must be capable of stopping 7.62mm fire.
Issue: <b>Need for more effective anti personnel capability for the M1A1(A2).</b>
Discussion: The majority of enemy forces faced were dismounted infantrymen. They could be effectively engaged and destroyed by 7.62 and .50 CAL fire. This, however, took time, and forced loaders and tank commanders to repeatedly expose themselves to reload under close combat. These small arms also hindered the fast clearing of fields of fire in thick vegetation.
Recommendation: Develop and field 120mm anti personnel munitions for the M1A1. <b>The additional shock and firepower of anti personnel main gun rounds such as white phosphorous and "beehive" would have facilitated the quicker destruction of the enemy and the collapse of his will to fight. Due to burning or shotgun like effects, these rounds also bring about the quick exposure of camouflaged enemy positions. This, in turn, translates, into safer conditions and fewer US casualties. </b>
Issue: <b>The lack of proper night vision equipment and target acquisition systems. </b>
Discussion:
Recommendation: At a minimum, upgrade the thermal sights on the M1A1 tank and M2A2 Bradley. Provide the most up to date passive night vision to heavy units, even if it means taking it from the "premier" light units who in fact followed this unit throughout Iraq. It would be ideal to see 3rd generation FLIR, CITVs, and fourth generation passive night vision.
<b>Elements of this unit consistently hesitated to engage and destroy enemy forces due to caution and the inability to clearly identify the enemy in daylight, thermal, and passive night vision sights. The Army's current policy of outfitting light units with the newest night vision technology, specifically passive night vision, is seriously flawed as demonstrated during this conflict. The PVS 7As currently utilized by most members of the company team proved all but worthless. The light units simply followed the heavy units which reinforces the need for the mechanized and heavy units to have the newest in night fighting equipment as heavy units are much more versatile than light units ever dreamed of being. Several vehicles crashed into berms and wadis due to the lack of proper night vision equipment. GPS and TIS sights could not provide positive identification of small arms, RPG's, or mortars beyond 800m, thus making it impossible to determine enemy activity or presence on vehicles without closing range or aid from scout vehicles. </b>
6. Manning.
Issue: Three 9-man squads vs. two 9-man squads and a 9-man weapons squad.
Discussion: While conducting multiple dismounted operations, the ability to commit two maneuver squads and still retain the flexibility to maintain an adequate suppressive fire platform from the ground was very critical to the success of this unit in combat operations. Having the weapons squad in its entirety, to deploy and maintain an overwhelming amount of firepower, under the control of one competent squad leader, enabled the two maneuver squads to execute their assigned tasks with all nine of their soldiers. This allowed for the training conducted to be executed in the same manner. Through repetition, the squads were very proficient in the execution of room/building clearing. This allowed the squad leader and the platoon leader to concentrate on the clearing of the building.
Recommendation: The two 9 man rifle squads and one-man weapon squad should replace the current three 9-man squad concept. The current doctrine has one soldier qualified on three weapon systems, depending on the environment of the operation. This concept does not provide for the loss of one of those personnel. The composition of the weapon squad should be as follows: 1 SSG squad leader, 3 M240B machine gunners, 3 M240B assistant gunners, and 2 Javelin AT gunners.
7. Logistics.
<b>Issue: CL IX (spare parts) parts flow throughout the operation was non-existent.
</b>
Discussion: Throughout the conduct of combat operations, the only CL IX parts available were those brought forward by the task force or those, which were cannibalized off of destroyed or damaged vehicles.
Recommendation: A CL IX package specific to the unit be loaded onto vehicles which have the capability to move forward with the speed of the combat units and the ability to mount weapon systems in order to expedite the movement of parts forward to the war fighter and the UMCP. Without this capability, the unit loses combat power critical to the conduct of the fight or stability operations. <b>This made maintenance operations difficult if not impossible for long periods of time.</b>
8. Maneuver.
We learned valuable lessons such as firing from the GAS sight at extremely close ranges, entering a battle sight range of 300m while in urban environments for the main gun, and decentralizing the location of CL I, water, and CL III(P) on the tank in order to protect from losing all supplies due to a single hit or building strike. <b>They learned to keep their tanks out of intersections and to scan the upper stories of buildings and rooftops for enemy forces. They practiced transporting infantry and coordinating direct fires with dismounted forces. These and other TTPs gave the platoon the confidence and experience required when attacks to Baghdad and raids south on HWY 8 were conducted.</b>
Recommendation: All armor platoons should be trained and integrated into urban operations training. Although the tactics trained may not have been executed, the lessons learned regarding load plans, fire control system adjustments, fire patterns, and scanning responsibilities were instrumental to the platoon's success. Every effort should be made to teach these lessons prior to combat.
Issue: <b>Attack aviation support was non-existent from LD throughout the entire combat operation. </b>
Discussion: <b>Throughout "OIF" from the crossing of the line of departure to the cessation of hostilities in Baghdad, the task force did not have any attack aviation support. As the brigade and division main effort, attack aviation should have been available at all times during combat operations or when enemy contact was likely. As it was, the aviators were not willing to fly to support the troops on the ground. </b>
Recommendation: The method in which commander's plan to employ attack aviation as a combat multiplier needs to be reviewed. Currently, commanders and staffs rely too much on attack aviation being a combat multiplier when conduct combat ratios, when as in this fight, it is discovered to be unreliable or non-existent. Commanders and staffs must plan primarily for each fight without the support of "attack" aviation as the aviators are unreliable at best.
Issue: <b>Special operations forces brought absolutely nothing to the fight during the conduct of combat operations but wanted support during SASO operations.</b>
Discussion: <b>Throughout this operation, special operations forces brought no information, which was of any value to the unit. In fact, never at one time did this unit have any special operations forces forward in zone or along an axis of attack providing critical information or intelligence. In fact, the situation was just the opposite. The special operations forces, hid or moved behind the protection of armored forces throughout the operation. This became especially evident during the transition from hostilities to SASO as this unit was tasked at least daily to provide either a QRF or transport to special operations forces into areas of the city to meet contacts or conduct "snatches".</b>
Recommendation: <b>Conventional ground commanders, the backbone of the army, cannot expect to receive any timely information from special operations forces during combat operations such as those experienced by this unit during "OIF". Additionally, the United States Army should review its current doctrine or lack of doctrine reference the integration of SOF and armor and mechanized infantry forces.</b>
How's that for an answer Booms?
"If we are not victorious, let no man return alive."
Gen George S. Patton
Edited by - m21 sniper on Sep 15 2003 1:24 PM
Edited by - m21 sniper on Sep 15 2003 1:26 PM
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