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The Author of this article was nice enough to send copies to a lot of the WT crew, but i am sure not everyone has seen it.
For the most part, i agree with his conclussions and analysis.
The Close Air Support Imperative, Armed Forces Journal December 2002
CAS Failings in Afghanistan Highlight Deficiencies in Air Force
Doctrine and
Equipment
Brig. Gen. David L. Grange, USA-Ret., Lt. Col. Walter Bjorneby,
USAF-Ret.,
Capt. Kelly Sullivan, ANG, Lt. Mike Sparks, USAR and Chuck Myers
As the U.S. military continues to transform itself into a truly
integrated
joint force that can operate against all adversaries, from armored
forces to
guerrilla bands, a critical requirement missing today, and into the
future,
is effective Close Air Support (CAS). There are severe deficiencies in
the
current aerial weapons platforms devoted to CAS, in the number of
trained
and equipped Forward Air Controllers (FACs), both ground and air, and
in the
training of CAS tactics, techniques and procedures.
CAS has taken a back seat to precision-guided munitions and pre-planned
aerial-delivered fires. Though precision fires are critical and offer
dramatic improvements in destroying stationary targets, many fleeting
mobile
targets on the battleground still require immediate, suppressive and
fixing
fires, at times over large pieces of ground, brought in very close to
maneuvering ground units. Cannon and machine gun fire, bombs under 500
pounds, and napalm are still viable supporting munitions for the
advancing
infantry soldier.
Ground force leaders and air and ground controllers still must have the
ability to call for, mark, direct and adjust CAS for maneuver forces
that are
searching for, encircling and destroying enemies and controlling key
terrain.
The ability to attain the synergistic effect of simultaneous fire from
ground
and air
weapons is critical to combat operations. Trained observers on the
ground
and in the air must exist with the know-how to employ, in conjunction
with
ground assaults, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft,
along with Army lift and gunship helicopters and indirect mortar,
artillery,
and rocket-fire.
Recent war games and combat operations in SouthWest Asia, such as
Operation
Anaconda, have demonstrated that our Armed Forces' ability to provide
and
employ effective CAS is waning.
Robert's Ridge, Afghanistan
Pinned down by enemy mortar fire with longer reach than the rifles and
machine guns in their hands, the rescuers for Navy SEAL Neil Roberts
are
themselves in need of rescue. Rallying around a downed MH-47E Chinook
helicopter, they have dead and some men who will be dead if they cannot
secure the area for an evacuation helicopter to land.
Finally after more than an hour's wait, F-15E Strike Eagles appear and
have
to be talked into doing gun strafing runs on the enemy's positions
since
they've never trained to do this CAS task. Nearly 15 hours later, the
area
is secure for extraction helicopters to land but not in time to save
some
men who died from their wounds and exposure.
In retrospect, the Strike Eagle pilots never had an opportunity to
practice
and were using a relatively short range 20 mm Gatling gun at altitude
and
moving too fast (400 knots) to provide effective CAS. The F-15E was not
meant for CAS. Its gun (M61) is an air-to-air back-up weapon.
The Air Force tried to put a "happy face" on all this, but the fact
remains
that after building more than 700 heavily armored A-10 attack planes
built
specifically for CAS for Army maneuver units, only a small fraction are
on
active flying status today. When its troops needed the air strikes on
Robert
s Ridge, the Army had to wait and soldiers died needlessly.
Some may counter argue that the F-15E is 300 knots faster (i.e., gets
to the
scene faster) and carries lots of bombs, but it also cannot loiter
overhead
pro-actively. And when it does arrive, it cannot fly slow enough to
render
effective CAS with gun strafing while the armored A-10 can fly low
enough to
be accurate. While F-15E are great strike aircraft, they are not
designed or
effectively equipped to support ground troops in close contact with the
enemy. The A-10 is.
The sad truth is that today, the U.S. military has no two-seat, manned,
long-loiter-time, fixed-wing observation/attack aircraft as a result of
the
Congressionally-forced retirement of Army OV-1s and the self-inflicted
retirement of Air Force/Marine Corps OV-10s. Unmanned aerial vehicles
cannot
really "see." While they can show a limited sensor view of the
battleground,
they lack the human eyes and mind that, from an aircraft, can
investigate
and comprehend the confusion that is a close combat fight.
Even more troubling is that the Air Force has hundreds of A-10s in
mothballs, some of which could be easily converted into two-seaters
that
could house an aerial observer to render the kind of alert air support
ground combat units need, freeing the pilot to fly the aircraft.
The current Air Force CAS state of affairs is unsatisfactory in light
of the
new geopolitical situation, in which asymmetric, primarily light
infantry
enemies seek to attack U.S. forces while hiding behind difficult
terrain,
vegetation and civilian populations. The U.S. military must regain "air
observational superiority" by fielding a two-seat observation/attack
aircraft to win the war on sub-national terrorism or else the bad guys
will
continue to get away.
In future combat, alert, agile CAS, guided by Forward Air Controllers
in the
air and on the ground, can ensure that friendly troops are not killed
by
friendly fires. Over-reliance on precision-guided bombs without FAC
help
means that at least 10 percent of air-dropped ordnance will go out of
control and could kill our troops. As was tragically discovered in
Afghanistan, even when the weather permitted, CAS from above 15,000
feet can
be as hazardous to friendly troops as to the enemy.
THE PRECISION FIREPOWER MYTH
The current media euphoria over near-precision munitions as a
battlefield
panacea hasn't factored in the many friendly deaths these bombs have
inflicted on our soldiers.
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) are not terminally guided but use
GPS
satellite-updated inertial guidance. Thus, they can and will go astray,
killing our own troops if misused as CAS weapons, especially if the
attack
aircraft is physically not oriented to the target so as to not fly over
the
heads of friendly troops.
As Rear Adm. Matthew G. Moffit, who is in charge of Navy aviation plans
and
requirements for air warfare, noted in the June 2002 National Defense
magazine, Satellite-guided weapons -- like the Joint Direct Attack
Munition -- dont require a picture of the target, just its
geo-coordinates.
But they are not ideally suited for time-critical strikes. The process
of
getting the GPS-guided bombs ready for firing takes longer than it
would
take for an aviator to spot a target with his sensor pod, beam a laser
and
release a laser-guided bomb.
For pre-planned targets, GPS-guided weapons work very well, Moffit
said.
For the time-critical targets, we needed a weapon that we could
actively
place on the target in real time. The mechanics of employing JDAM cause
delays, he said, because the pilot has to get the coordinates, make
sure
they are correct, input them in the system and finally release the
weapon. "Its much easier to use laser-guided bombs, get eyes-on-target,
track the target, [beam it with the] laser, drop the weapon.
Terminally guided means that a FAC on the air or ground designates the
target by illuminating it with a laser beam, and then the ordnance
flies
directly to that spot or the FAC directs the attack aircraft by radio
to a
safe line-of-sight attack path parallel (not perpendicular) to friendly
troops.
A First Sgt. in the 101st Air Assault Division wrote this of his combat
experience in Afghanistan: "The problem with our mortars was there was
a
24-hour CAS cap. And [attack aircraft] wouldn't fly near us if we were
firing indirect, even though our max ordnant [how high mortar rounds
arc
into the sky] was far beneath their patterns. Something for you and
your ALO
[Air Liaison Officer] to work out. The other problem was the Air Force
could
never hit small groups of personnel. I watched and called corrections
on
numerous sorties and they could never hit the targets. Pay close
attention
to the direction of attack your ALO is bringing in the CAS. Every time
it
was perpendicular to us, we were hit with shrapnel. Not to mention the
time
they dropped a 2000-pound bomb in the middle of our company that didn't
go
off by a sheer miracle. Cobras [Marine Corps AH-1W helicopters] and
2.75
[rockets] shot at us also, and once again they were shooting
perpendicular
to our trace. Aviation provided the most near misses of all the things
we
did."
Trying to steer bombs and missiles from a distant, offset location is
problem-prone and gets worse the farther away you try to do it. Alleged
"precision" munitions guidance has led to a lack of appreciation for
CAS
strikes being guided by a FAC on the ground using verbal directions
via
radio or a laser spot for terminal guidance -- so the attack aircraft
is
lined up on the target and there are fewer physical things that can go
wrong. Munitions still bump into each other on release from the rack
and
fins get bent, for example.
GPS-guided bombs can cause friendly fire casualties as a result of a
number
of factors: a defective guidance system or one damaged during transport
or
installation; incorrect GPS coordinates sent by the targeting system;
incorrect GPS coordinates entered into the bomb; GPS signal
interference
from nearby mountains, buildings, or solar flares; or GPS signal
jamming.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Present Air Force CAS doctrine and equipment is far from adequate and
must
be improved. While space constraints limit discussion of numerous
specific
solutions, a good first step would be to convert all OA-10A (A-10s that
were
redesignated as FAC aircraft) into two-seat OA-10B models to
accommodate an
observer in back to spot targets (aided by binoculars with an
image-stabilization feature, which can distinguish buildings and
vehicles
from 20,000 feet.)
A FAC career field should be established for non-rated officers instead
of
the grounded flyers who are now called ALOs and are unhappily filling a
position in an ad hoc manner. It would include both the AFAC or
Airborne
Forward Air Controller, who would be the observer in the rear seat of
an
OA-10B, and the GFAC, the Ground Forward Air Controller on foot or in a
vehicle and equipped with laser-ranging and -target designation systems
and
secure communications to connect with all "players" in the air and on
the
ground. Career FAC officers would all spend time as an AFAC; thus, they
would "speak the same language" and have the perspective and confidence
of
the pilots to work together for terminal guidance. CAS is a demanding
mission that takes proficiency from both the pilot and the FAC.
Enlisted GFACs also would be trained as OA-10B AFAC observers, so they
would
have a perspective from the air, too. In fact, they should rotate tours
of
duty as GFACs and AFACs throughout their careers. This will also make
this
career field challenging and rewarding for all involved.
An OA-10B could fly continuously over friendly ground maneuver troops.
If
targets emerged and Army units requested that they be struck, the
OA-10B
could immediately take care of small targets with its 30 mm cannon and
twin
underwing GAU-19/A .50-caliber Gatling gun pods and laser-guided
Hydra-70mm
rockets, with laser target marking done by GFACs. If additional
firepower
was required to suppress the target, the OA-10B could shoot smoke
rockets to
assist other fighter-bombers, such as F-15Es or single-seat A-10s on
strip
alert, in attacking the target with guns, rockets, and bombs.
Air Force CAS is not a panacea for all Army ground maneuver firepower
needs;
the Army must have area-coverage types of fires, including smoke,
scatterable mines, illumination rounds, and all-weather guaranteed fire
support that only its own artillery and mortars can provide in a
cost-efficient way. Making CAS all that it can be is only a part of the
total joint transformation required.
The return of AFACs and GFACs in a dedicated Air Force career field and
a
two-seat manned observation/attack aircraft is an urgent requirement
that
can be filled quickly at low cost to the taxpayer.
Gen. Grange is Chief Operating Officer of the McCormick Tribune
Foundation.
Lt. Col. Bjorneby is a retired F-4 fighter-bomber pilot and consultant.
Capt. Sullivan is an Air National Guard FAC and former F-15A and Army
helicopter pilot. Lt. Sparks is an Army Reserve Infantry officer,
former
noncommissioned officer, and leader of the 1st Tactical Studies Group,
a
non-profit think-tank. Chuck Myers, a former WWII and Korean war attack
pilot, is a defense consultant for AeroCounsel.
Trample the wounded- hurdle the dead.
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