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Not that this is good news, but the fact that the truth is emerging is welcomed...

Cheers! M2

<b>Report Details 'Friendly Fire' Casualties In Deadly Battle</b>

<i>As many as 10 Marines might have been killed by U.S. forces during the deadliest fighting of the Iraq war in March 2003, a document shows.</i>

By Hector Becerra, Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers

As many as 10 Marines may have been killed by friendly fire in the midst of the deadliest battle of the Iraq war when a Marine air controller mistakenly cleared Air Force A-10 jets to shoot on U.S. positions, according to a long-awaited military investigation.

The report, portions of which were obtained by The Times on Saturday, paints a chaotic picture of the March 23, 2003, battle in the southern Iraq city of Nasiriyah, as Marines fought to seize two bridges crucial to the American advance on Baghdad.

When Marine units around the city lost communication, commanders became confused about the location of American troops. Two tank-busting jets were given permission by a controller to attack what turned out to be a forward Marine company. The documents describe 15 minutes of air attacks on the friendly forces using 30-millimeter Gatling guns, Maverick missiles and bombs, ending in the destruction of two amphibious assault vehicles that were trying to evacuate wounded Marines.

The full report, running hundreds of pages, is scheduled to be released this week.

In contrast to the descriptions of precision bombing that have come to define the American military, Marine and Air Force investigators documented a chain of faulty battlefield assumptions by the Marine forward air controller and other commanders who did not know where their troops were arrayed on the battlefield and had scant means of communicating during the fight.

In all, 18 Marines were killed, including four Californians, and 17 were wounded during three hours of intense fighting with Iraqi army troops and militiamen.

"The A-10s targeted what turned out to be" U.S. Marines, the report states, "making multiple passes against them.

"Eventually, the A-10s were told to cease fire, which they did."

Of the 18 killed, the investigation found that eight had died "solely" as the result of enemy fire. But it added, "the intensity of the enemy fire, combined with friendly fire, makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and source of fires that killed the other 10 Marines." The Marines who might have been killed by friendly fire were not identified in the documents obtained by The Times. Of the 17 Marines wounded in the battle, four were hit by a combination of enemy and friendly fire, the investigation found.

In a carefully choreographed release, the nearly 900-page report was presented Saturday in briefings to relatives of Marines who had died that day. The emotional, and sometimes tense, sessions unfolded simultaneously in living rooms from Southern California to Connecticut.

Some relatives welcomed the briefings, saying the process would help them move on. Others said the report left painful questions unanswered.

Larry Hutchings, 52, of Boiling Springs, S.C., was told that his son, Cpl. Nolen Hutchings, had died in a Marine vehicle hit by both a U.S. missile and an Iraqi rocket-propelled grenade. "They don't know which hit it first," he said.

The A-10s are equipped with gun cameras that take pictures of what they are shooting, but Hutchings said he had been told that the film no longer existed. "They said they were recorded over accidentally," he said.

Like many other family members, Hutchings questioned why the report had taken so long to release. He said a Marine officer had told him Saturday that the investigation had "sat on somebody's desk" for four months.

"He didn't have an explanation for that," Hutchings said.

Two casualty officers delivered the news in a Rialto living room to Lance Cpl. Jorge Gonzalez's parents, Mario and Rosa, and the Marine's widow, Jasty Gonzalez.

Amid countless photos of Gonzalez, the Marines told the family that Gonzalez had died from enemy fire, suffering extensive damage to his legs and head. His 1-year-old son, who was born after Gonzalez left for the Persian Gulf, played in the family's living room during the briefing.

Rosa Gonzalez, the Marine's mother, expressed anger before the briefing even began. "What's insulting is that it took a year for this," she said

Marine Capt. Matthew Bucher then explained the sequence of the battle. "He had passed on at a point before the Air Force jets showed up," Bucher said. "Your son was killed by Iraqi enemy fire. He was killed by what's called indirect fire from the enemy. An enemy mortar man was the cause of your son's death, not friendly fire." Gonzalez's death appeared to have been very quick, he said.

The Marines told the tearful mother that neither her son's body, nor the position the Americans had taken, had ever been lost to Iraqis, trying to allay a fear that has haunted Gonzalez's parents since they saw televised footage that showed dead servicemen and thought they saw their son.

Between heaving sobs, Rosa Gonzalez expressed in her basic English some relief that, at long last, she was being told that her son had died from enemy fire. She asked the casualty officers why the military hadn't sent in tanks or laid down air strikes before sending her son's company to the bridge. There were still Iraqi civilians living in nearby homes who had never been evacuated by the Iraqi government, the family was told.

The Marine's wife said that, after hearing stories from Marines who had fought in Nasiriyah, she had feared that her husband had been struck by aircraft fire. "I was expecting to hear, 'I'm sorry, but he was killed by the A-10,' " she said after being briefed. "I'm glad it wasn't friendly fire. It would have made me furious if it had been."

The battle for the bridges in Nasiriyah began early on March 23, the fourth day of the war. The mission for Charlie Company, part of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment out of Camp Lejeune, N.C., was to secure a bridge across the Saddam Canal on the northern edge of the city. Controlling the span was essential to opening a route for a massive Marine Expeditionary Force to attack Baghdad.

Charlie Company, riding in a convoy of 11 amphibious assault vehicles, or tracks, ended up alone at the north bridge, with other units scattered at southern and eastern edges of the city.

As the surrounded company fought to hold the bridge, the Air Force A-10s began circling overhead. Initially, some of the Marines felt a sense of relief; American firepower was at hand. But the planes turned against them.

A Marine forward air controller, stationed with a unit southeast of the bridge, cleared two A-10 attack jets to fire upon vehicles north of the bridge. The controller believed he was with the lead Marine unit and that only Iraqis were north of the canal, according to a separate Air Force report on the incident, which was included with the military investigation.

The air controller, responsible for directing jets in support of ground troops, did not realize that Charlie Company had seized the bridge, as ordered, and assumed positions to its north, the Air Force report states.

When he cleared the jets to attack targets north of the bridge, the forward air controller could see neither the jets nor the targets.

The controller, the report states, notified the A-10s "that no friendlies were north … of the canal."

The two jets then dropped three bombs on Marines' positions, the report states. But Marines on the ground, apparently mistaking the bomb explosions for Iraqi mortar fire, did not realize they were under attack by U.S. aircraft until the A-10s began firing at them with their rapid-fire 30-millimeter guns, the report states.

"Numerous witnesses stated that they saw Marines killed or struck by 30-millimeter rounds" and heard or saw Marine amphibious assault vehicles struck by 30-millimeter rounds, the report states, adding that the Marines tried to fire "doctrinal ordnance" to alert the jets that they were attacking friendly positions — to no avail.

Then, as Marines began evacuating wounded from the battlefield by driving four amphibious assault vehicles back across the bridge to the south, they were attacked again by both A-10s.

The pilots told investigators, according to the Air Force report, that the Marine forward air controller had instructed them "not to let those vehicles get across the bridge."

One of the jets attacked and hit one of the Marine vehicles with a Maverick missile 100 meters south of the bridge "and destroyed it." The second jet fired a Maverick at a second Marine vehicle 200 meters south of the bridge and destroyed it as well.

The engagement ended when a platoon commander from Charlie Company finally managed to get a forward command post on the radio and reported that his men were under friendly fire assault. The forward air controller then ordered the jets to " 'check fire' … and told them that there may have been Marines north of the Saddam Canal," the Air Force report states.

Here's the actual unclassified report

It's a PDF from GlobalSecurity.org

http://globalsecurity.org/military/libr ... ction1.pdf

Excerpts:

"...unbeknownst to either Charlie Company or Bravo Company, this manuever put Charlie Company in the lead."

"...the Air Officer, located with the Forward Command Post, called the Bravo Company FAC, requesting CAS..."

"The A-10s spotted a burning vehicle (thought to be an enemy vehicle, but turned out to be a damaged Charlie Company AAV) north of the northern brigde and reported it to the FAC, who could see the smoke and verified them to be in the target area. The A-10s noticed multiple vehicles in this area and reported them believing them to be hostile."

"The FAC was not able to see the A-10s or a specific target. Therefore, he confirmed the target location with the A-10s and attempted to verify the location of the lead element with the Bravo Company Commander"

"...the Bravo Company Commander identified their company as the lead element, and, therefore, believing that only enemy forces were ahead, he cleared the target for fire."

"The FAC informed the A-10s that there were no friendly forces north of the brigde and they were cleared to engage."




Edited by - ViperTTb on Apr 08 2004 10:38 AM

A simple "Charlie co. where are your people, any on the north side of the bridge?" would've probably averted this tradgedy.

"It should come as a surprise only to the fools among the men of our generation that we liked war."

Major V. 'Popski' Poniakov, British LRG, WWII

Just got a 'briefing' from the USMC LTC that headed the investigation. Seems that the Gun camera tapes wouldn't have helped much anyway. The circumstances surrounding one of them are pretty fishy.

He was pretty pissed off at yours truly and some of my comments.
Guess i still know how to ruffle a field grades feathers.

"It should come as a surprise only to the fools among the men of our generation that we liked war."

Major V. 'Popski' Poniakov, British LRG, WWII

Good point Snipe.

Theres a purpose behind force feedbacking each other....

"The power to Destroy the planet, is insignifigant to the power of the Air Force----Mudd Vader

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A simple "Charlie co. where are your people, any on the north side of the bridge?" would've probably averted this tradgedy.
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With the amount of screw ups that took place to allow this incident to happen, <i>nothing</i> is 'simple'.

Charlie Company was under intense enemy fire before the fratricide happened, and their comm was nonexistant. They attempted to call off the A-10s several times, but to no avail. One part of the report states that both Charlie and Bravo were actually getting the antennas shot off their vehicles!

The link through Global Security only shows the first 100 pages of what is a 700+ page document. In case you're wondering, I read the entire thing over several nights the past week and a half. To see it, go here:

http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/newsfeatures.asp

On the far right side of the page are the links to the <u>full</u> unclass report. There are also pictures of the damage done to the AAVs further down on the right side. Picture number 42 is what happens when a Maverick hits a AAV. Very ugly.

What really gets me is that it seems at some point between Desert Storm and this incident, a decision was made in the Pentagon that these Marines' lives were not worth the money it would have taken to equip our fighter/attack communities with a decent blue force tracker. It amazes me that some F-16s have SADL, which gives cues in the HUD when friendlies are in the HUD field of view, but A-10s that do the majority of CAS don't have an equivilent (or better) system. I imagine (hope to God, actually) that with Suite III/Precision Engagement upgrade including a data link, some sort of blue force tracker will also be integrated. When that becomes a reality, it will be years late and ??? Marines' (and numerous other friendly) lives short in my opinion.

Snipe, I can understand you taking a Devil's Advocate view on this incident, as well as the FFIB's report on it, since you're a former snake eater. There are a lot of lessons to be learned from this incident, but saying that a radio call would have prevented it (in a perfect world, it might have) is oversimplifying things. Additionally, the full report details the 'standardized' procedures by which 8 mil tape was reviewed by intel in the debrief (not very standardized at all), and the procedures for saving tapes (none). The Hog pilots talked to the GLO immediately after the sortie, and asked if there had been a friendly fire incident. The GLO responded by saying if there had been any fratricide, he would have heard about it before the pilots even landed. For a few days, those pilots didn't know the reality of the situation, and in that time the tapes disappeared.

Almost a year ago one of my neighbors in my apartment complex (I'll call him John), a Marine, went back home to attend the funeral of a guy he grew up with. They had both joined the Marines out of high school. John's buddy had died in Iraq, and when John came home from the funeral I got together with him to toast his (ours, actually) fallen comrade. John told me that it had taken a few days for the Marines to locate his friend's body, and the viewing had been closed casket. His buddy's family was dealing with the death well, knowing that their Marine had died doing what he loved, serving his country, and that he was now in a better place.

After reading a certain section of the full unclass report, it became clear to me that John's buddy had died as a result of this friendly fire incident. Until this point, John thought that his buddy had died due to enemy action. I immediately went over to John's place and brought up the report on his computer. His friend's name is in the surviving Marines' testimony. The Marines couldn't identify him as being KIA right away because he was in one of the AAVs shot with a Maverick.

I told John that I didn't have the honor of knowing his friend or the other Marines, but that my life, and the world, was a lesser place because of their loss.

John's attitude about the whole incident is that $#it happens, and it's an unfortunate cost of the business we're in. Don't get me wrong, John was very upset at the loss of his friend and the other Marines. However, John said that if Charlie Company had really been bad guys and the A-10 drivers had hesitated to roll in at Bravo Company's direction, it potentially would have been Bravo that paid the price. The way John looks at it, don't second guess why it happened, just learn from it, press on, and do your job. Spoken like a true Marine.

I am in a continuing email conversation with the USMC LTC(who is himself an aviator) that headed the investigation, and there are circumstances that prevented the jarheads in the lead company on the ground from using the radios.

I have asked him to come to a-10.org and post some details as well as hold an informal Q&A for the Hog drivers and other MILPERS here in the hope that we can all learn something from this mess to possibly prevent this sort of thing in the future. I am awaiting his response.

"When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier."

Kipling-

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I am in a continuing email conversation with the USMC LTC(who is himself an aviator) that headed the investigation, and there are circumstances that prevented the jarheads in the lead company on the ground from using the radios.

I have asked him to come to a-10.org and post some details as well as hold an informal Q&A for the Hog drivers and other MILPERS here in the hope that we can all learn something from this mess to possibly prevent this sort of thing in the future. I am awaiting his response.
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That would be the heat. Hearing from the individual who headed the investigation would be great.

He seems to be a pretty nice guy, and a squared away officer. I'm sure if he has the time in his schedule he'll happily do it, but i'm waiting for his OK before i post any of our convo, in case he can't do the Q&A thing.

"When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier."

Kipling-