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Congressional pressure alone would not be enough to swing an Air Force decision against the service's own assessment, but neither was it in the USAF's interest to let a major contractor lose its capability to design and build a complete military aircraft. Competition was - and remains - a key element in the USAF procurement system, and the service had come to expect at least half-a-dozen responses from qualified suppliers to any of its RFPS. Other things being equal, this factor would tend to favor Fairchild.
Results from the fly-off competition were close. The Northrop type displayed better handling qualities in some respects; the YA-10A proved slightly superior from the maintenance viewpoint; but both aircraft improved on the specification. Systems Command's analysis showed a significant advantage for the Fairchild aircraft in the important area of survivability. The YA-10A, due partly to its unconventional configuration, appeared to be better protected against attack. The most important difference, though, was that the YA-10A was much more representative of a production-type A-X than the YA-9A, something which had been reflected in the higher price quoted and paid for the Fairchild prototypes. This would mean an easier transition to production, with lower risks and smaller learning costs.
Barely two weeks after the close of the fly-off and maintenance comparison, on January 18, 1973, the USAF announced the selection of the Fairchild aircraft. In the following weeks, the USAF and Fairchild negotiated a $159 million contract, covering ten development, test and evaluation (DT & E) aircraft for further testing. (This batch was later cut to six aircraft by Congress, and the remaining four pre-production aircraft were completed under the first production contract.) The contract included an option for initial production of 48 aircraft, but the A-10 would not be ordered in quantity until further tests of the aircraft had been completed, and the effectiveness of the GAU-8 had been demonstrated.
At the same time, the General Electric TF34 was selected to power the new aircraft. This was not a foregone conclusion, because an Avco-powered A-10 and a GE-powered A-9 had both been studied, and Avco Lycoming was offering a developed version of the F 102 with greater power and growth potential. While the F102 was being offered at a considerably lower price than the TF34, the GE engine had one tremendous advantage: it was three years into a full-scale development program for a military aircraft. The USAF also planned to use eight TF34s to power the Boeing AWACS (the idea was dropped a few weeks later) and large-scale orders held the prospect of lower unit costs in the future. Moreover, Fairchild and GE had worked together on a package of low risk modifications to the TF34 which would reduce its cost without degrading its performance in the A-X.
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